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Introduction
The Blue Eagle Is Not Extinct
Its Labor Law Is Alive and Ready to Fly
Almost all ancient peoples believed the Earth to be flat. And almost all Amer-
icans involved in employment relations believe that a minority union has no
right to engage in collective bargaining, even where no majority union has
yet been designated. But come with me on a journey of legal discovery-or
rather rediscovery-and we shall learn that this conventional wisdom is an
illusion without foundation and that what will appear to be a new world of
labor relations lies beyond. Historically, however, this new legal landscape
will be no more new than the new world that Columbus found, but the
prospect for change in American labor relations, as with the rediscovery of
America, will indeed be new.
My personal journey of rediscovery began in the year 2000 when a friend,
Peter Zschiesche, director of the San Diego Employee Rights Center,l called
my attention to the plight of seventeen immigrant workers for whom he had
filed an unfair labor practice charge. These were young men who had been
employed at Hi Tech Honeycomb, Inc.,2 a southern California aerospace
subcontracting company. Reacting to their low wages and abysmal working
conditions, on the morning of February 10, 1999-without labor-union as-
sistance-they organized themselves into an informal peer group and staged
a brief walkout to protest those conditions. The company owner refused to
meet with them as a group to discuss their grievances and swiftly retaliated
by firing all of them. In response to Zschiesche's request, I provided those
workers with pro bono legal representation before the Regional Director and
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, or
Board). While engaged in such representation, I began to analyze the multi-
ple legal issues posed by their situation and to delve into the labor and leg-
islative history that affected those issues. After lengthy study that continued
far beyond the final action in the NLRB case, I was able to confidently re-
2 I The Blue Eagle at Work
confirm-contrary to conventional wisdom-that in workplaces where
there is not yet a majority/exclusive representative, collective bargaining on
behalf of the members of a minority labor union is a protected right fully
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, Wagner Act, or
Act).3
The yield from that and further research and analysis forms the core of
this book, which also explores the nature of the end product of such mem-
bers-only union organizing and bargaining and the impact that this redis-
covered process will likely have on future labor-management relations in this
country. This book is therefore a hybrid of the interrelated disciplines of la-
bor law and industrial relations, with a generous dollop of labor history. Al-
though my primary aim is to provide rigorous and objective legal analyses
of the propositions posed herein, the importance of those issues compels me
to direct my text to both legal and lay audiences. It is thus my hope that this
presentation-in which I have tried to avoid legal and academic jargon-
will be of interest and use to a wide range of readers, including lawyers,
judges, and administrative personnel who regularly handle labor-law prob-
lems, as well as others who deal directly with employee relations on a daily
basis (i.e., human resource professionals, union officials and organizers, and
individual employees and employers who might desire more knowledge
about the legal nature of their own employment relationship) and of course
academics and students in all of these fields.
My attention to the iconoclastic thesis that I am here presenting was
prompted earlier-in 1990-when I read Professor Clyde Summers's article,
Unions without Majority - A Black Hole,4 in which he made an observation
that had not appeared in the legal literature since 1936,5 to wit, that the plain
words of the Act "would seem to require an employer, in the absence of a
majority union, to bargain collectively with a non-majority union for its own
members";6 and he noted various historical features to support that obser-
vation. He suggested, however, that "it may be too late to open this ques-
tion."? Writing separately in 1993, Professors Alan Hyde and Matthew
Finkin, although not disagreeing with Summers's premise,s contended that
because of the passage of time legislative action would be required to reaf-
firm this true meaning of the law. Rejecting that pessimistic appraisal, I wrote
in 1994 that although "the role of the minority union should be reaffirmed
and reinvigorated. . . amending the Act is not essential to the confirmation
of the existence of the rights of minority unions";9 nevertheless, I then con-
ceded that amendments, or perhaps the issuance of administrative rules,
would be desirable to emphasize and clarify those rights.1° And so the mat-
ter rested-at least for me-until my interest was aroused again by the
peremptory firing of those seventeen immigrant workers. Subsequent re-
search that I initiated on their behalf produced considerable new evidence
and substantiated that the present law is clear and sufficient, that amend-
ments to the Act-which in any event would be unobtainable in the fore-
seeable future-are unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose.
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What happened to those seventeen workers was a disgrace to American
democracy. Those young men, who were of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and
Philippine originll and new to America, apparently trusted that this was a
land of opportunity where they could improve their lot through hard work
and cooperation with others. Lacking the usual fear that traditional Ameri-
can employees typically display toward organizational activity in the work-
place, they boldly decided to join together to confront their employer about
their grievances. The company, which employed about fifty production
workers, manufactured honeycombs (filters made of welded metal that re-
semble beehive honeycombs) for jet engines. Despite the low wages, which
were only slightly above minimum wage for most of the group, the employ-
ees' job tasks required considerable skill and attention. The group's chief
complaints were that they had been promised wage increases that were ei-
ther long delayed or never delivered; they had been denied such basic safety
protections as gloves (for handling hazardous fluid) and safety goggles and
face masks when needed; some of them had been promised promotions
which never materialized; some had often been denied rest breaks; and some
had suffered verbal abuse from the owner himself.
Operating on the premise that "enough is enough," these aggrieved work-
ers organized and signed a petition for presentation to their employer
through a spokesperson whom they had democratically selected. He then
asked management for a meeting on behalf of the group, but when that was
not promptly forthcoming the aggrieved employees shut down their ma-
chines and quietly walked out. Soon after, they gathered at a meeting in a
public park near where they lived, and later that day they returned to the fac-
tory to renew their request for a group meeting with management to discuss
their complaints. The owner denied their request, insisting that the company
would not meet with them as a group and would only see them individually.
Preferring to maintain their group solidarity, the employees refused to meet
alone, whereupon management immediately advised them that they had all
forfeited their jobs. They were thus terminated for having engaged in con-
certed activity that was intended to improve their wages and working con-
ditions through a civilized process of jointly discussing their grievances with
management-that is, through a rudimentary form of collective bargaining.
Federal law unequivocally states that they "have the right. . . to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing. . . ." 12The Hi Tech
owner admitted to one of his supervisors that the reason "he did not want
them together as a group [was] because he felt that they would back each
other up if he offered something to one employee." This seemed to fly in the
face of the congressional intent behind the Act that was meant to create
"some equality of bargaining power." 13
Out of desperation-for they had families to feed-several of the men
broke ranks. Later that afternoon, assuming they had no alternative, a few
met individually with management, and some were rehired shortly thereafter.
A few others were selectively rehired during the next several months. The re-
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mainder sought other employment or left the area. Hi Tech Honeycomb had
thus effectively squelched this fledgling effort by a group of its employees to
achieve self-organization in their new American workplace.
Previous to my being made aware of the happenings at Hi Tech, the NLRB
Regional Director had issued a complaint against the company and the case
was set for hearing, for the discharges were clearly in violation of well-set-
tled law14 (although the employer could have obtained the same result
legally by replacing-instead of discharging-the striking employees15).
However, it had not occurred to the Regional Director to seek an order re-
quiring the employer to meet and bargain with the employee group, which
was really the key issue. I tried, unsuccessfully, to achieve that objective with
an amendment to the complaint, citing as a separate unfair labor practice the
company's refusal to meet with the employees as a group. The General Coun-
sel declined to consider such an amendment because the case had already
been set for hearing and apparently a settlement was deemed likely. In fact,
over my objection, the employer eagerly settled the case for 80 percent of
lost back wages, a belated offer of reinstatement (a year and a half had
elapsed since the discharges), and the posting of an effectively meaningless
notice. Thus, for a total payment of only $26,000 for all lost wages, the com-
pany was able to relish its success in crushing the organizational efforts of
seventeen courageous but naIve employees.
The National Labor Relations Act, or at least its administration, had to-
tally failed these new American workers at the most critical point on the scale
of rights protected by the Act-the point of initial organizing and rudimen-
tary collective bargaining. Yet this inaction of Board officials was fully con-
sistent with conventional wisdom, according to which Hi Tech had no duty
to bargain with the representative of that employee group, notwithstanding
that the group was clearly, in the words of the statute, an "organization[,]
committee or plan" formed for the purpose of bargaining collectively with
the employer "concerning grievances."16 When I noted this, together with
other legal arguments, to Leonard Page, the NLRB General Counsel at the
time, he did not disagree with my construction of the law (indeed four ear-
lier General Counsels had indicated their agreement in similar cases17), but
he declined to amend the complaint for the reasons already noted, indicat-
ing, however, that he would reconsider "this type allegation in a more ap-
propriate case." Unfortunately, however, Page's tenure as General Counsel
expired a few months later. The conventional wisdom on this issue thus re-
mains ripe for reconsideration, which is the justification for this book.
About that conventional wisdom-actually latter-day conventional wis-
dom-as Sportin' Life in Porgy and Bess reminds us, "it ain't necessarily
so." 18In fact, minority-union recognition by employers, accompanied by bi-
lateral collective bargaining for union members only, was the original con-
ventional wisdom on this subject, for such bargaining was commonly
practiced following passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. Although the ulti-
Introduction: The Blue Eagle Is Not Extinct I 5
mate goal of the statute was the institution of exclusive collective bargain-
ing with majority unions, in workplaces where majority bargaining was not
yet established Congress did not intend to bar minority-union members-only
bargaining, which was deemed a preliminary stage in the development of ma-
ture collective bargaining.19
It may come as a surprise to most readers to learn that members-on:ly bar-
gaining was widely practiced by employers and unions during the early years
following passage of the Wagner Act. In fact, one of the most influential cor-
porate executives in the nation, Myron C. Taylor, U.S. Steel's chairman of
the board and chief policy maker, issued a written formula for union recog-
nition in 1937 that declared that
The Company recognizes the right of its employees to bargain collectively
through representatives freely chosen by them [and] will negotiate and con-
tract with the representatives of any group of its employees so chosen and
with any organization as the representative of its members. . . .20
That is exactly what U.S. Steel did several months later when it signed a
members-only agreement with the CIO Steelworkers Union,21 which at the
time represented less than a majority of the company's eligible employees.
That same pattern was widely followed in most of the steel industry and else-
where. Eighty-five percent of the original Steelworkers agreements were for
"members only," as were 64 percent of the UAW22 contracts in the auto
industry. Indeed, in the late 193 os members-only contracts, which were pop-
ular with both the CIO and AFL23 unions, were just as common as major-
ity-exclusivity contracts.24 When a union finally achieved majority status
under such contracts, which almost always occurred, these preliminary
agreements were typically followed by conventional exclusive-recognition
agreements. The postenactment industrial relations community was thus
putting into effect what scholarly comment on the new law had already ob-
served, for in 1936 E. G. Latham, a fellow of the Social Science Research
Council, had written that "it appears to be a reasonable construction [of the
Act that] the employer may be bound to bargain with minority groups un-
til . . . <proper majorities' have been selected. "25 He concluded that" [IJt is
reasonable to suppose that where there is no majority organization at all . . .
minority rights are. . . reserved."26
Notwithstanding that early history, today almost everyone in the field of
labor and employment relations takes for granted that American employers
have no duty to bargain with any union until its majority status has been cer-
tified or recognized, usually as a result of an NLRB election. That assump-
tion has long prevailed despite the fact that the Act clearly indicates that in
workplaces where no exclusive bargaining agent has yet been" designated or
selected. . . by the majority of the employees" in an appropriate bargaining
unit pursuant to Section 9(a),27 all employees, regardless of majority status,
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are entitled "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."28 At first blush, this literal reading of the law may sound like a
radical proposition, but it is not. As the reader will discover, not only is this
meaning conveyed by the ordinary language contained in the statutory text,
it is also fully supported by unequivocal legislative history. But if that is so,
why is it that latter-day conventional wisdom assumes the contrary? In an
ironic twist of history, a misunderstanding of the law's protection-or at
least an unawareness of that protection-evolved despite the absence of any
decisional authority to support the conventional view. As the record will
show, neither the NLRB nor the courts have ever held that an employer has
no duty to bargain with a minority union for its members only, although in
a few cases there are vague dicta-but no decisional holdings-that pay lip
service to latter-day conventional wisdom.29 Notwithstanding the absence
of any adverse rulings-in fact all of the related cases are supportive3O-the
early practice of members-only bargaining was abandoned and eventually
forgotten. Why?
The reason is simple. After the labor movement had made use of mem-
bers-only bargaining for only a few years, it quickly became apparent that a
faster and less expensive way to obtain exclusive recognition was available
through direct NLRB representational processes, usually by means of an
election. In the Board's first decade, the unions' success rate through this
route was truly phenomenal-in over 85 percent of all NLRB representation
cases the unions won recognition.31 Consequently, out of sheer convenience
for most unions, NLRB elections became the favored organizational device.
And in a relatively short period of time-which included the period during
World War II and the postwar boom that followed-this deceptively easy
expedient became habit-forming. From then on, the labor movement made
no visible effort to resume organizing through members-only bargaining.
And after I947 unions were busilydistracted by massiveamounts of litiga-
tion engendered by the Taft-Hartley Act,32 whereupon members-only bar-
gaining was effectively forgotten. Although such institutional forgetfulness
may be understandable, it is nonetheless to be regretted, for the premature
abandonment of minority-union organizing and bargaining undoubtedly
contributed to the steady decline in the density of union membership and
coverage.
Employers, however, had no reason to question the dependence on the
election process, for elections provided them with an ideal forum in which
to mount offensive campaigns against union representation. Thus, in a short
time NLRB elections became the centerpiece of the statute and the estab-
lished norm for union organizing. Accordingly, the interplay of employer
self-interest and union acquiescence eventually repressed all institutional
memoryof the duty to bargain with minority unions, and the lack of wisdom
about that duty metamorphosed into the latter-day conventional wisdom.
Although labor's retreat from members-only organizing and bargaining was
--
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not the product of deliberate decision-it just happened, without any of the
principals being aware that it was happening-the impact of that retreat
lJ1eant that Senator Robert F. Wagner's vision of industrial democracy would
be put on hold.
That vision about the role of democracy in the workplace, for which Sen-
ator Wagner provided the legislative imprimatur, was neither novel nor rev-
olutionary. The concept of industrial democracy had a long history in
American political and economic thought. In the early days of the republic,
Albert Gallatin, Treasury Secretary under Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, advocated that the democratic principle of "the political process"
be applied as well to "the industrial operation,"33 and expressions of that
goal were reiterated countlessly. For example, the United States Industrial
Relations Commission of 1902 declared that only by the introduction of an
"element of democracy into the governance of industry [can] workers. . . ef-
fectively take part in determining the conditions under which they work."34
And Louis D. Brandeis renewed that thesis in 1915 when he reminded the
country that attainment of "rule by the people. . . involves industrial democ-
racy as well as political democracy."35
It was Senator Wagner's view that a partnership between employers and
labor unions was an "indispensable complement to political democracy."36
When he submitted his bill to the Senate in 1935, he therefore envisioned a
"new industrial democracy that is bound to come, that is growing, here at
our feet, inexorably. . . ."37 And two years after passage of the Act he reem-
phasized that
The struggle for a voice in industry through the process of collective bar-
gaining is at the heart of the struggle for the preservation of political as well
as economic democracy in America.38
In passing the Wagner Act, Congress clearly intended that employees would
participate in the democratic process of determining their working condi-
tions through collective bargaining. In addition to the Act's substantive pro-
visions to that effect, its opening section specifically declared this to be the
official policy of the United States,39 and, despite some wishful thinking to
the contrary by the employer community, Congress has never amended that
policy.4o
The collective bargaining process that Wagner envisioned was to begin
with the democratic expression of the right of association that would be
achieved through the exercise and enforcement of certain basic employee
rights, including the right to join labor unions and engage in collective bar-
gaining. These are essentially the same rights that the civilized world later
recognized to be fundamental human rights41 and which the United States
reaffirmed by international agreements in 1992 and 1998.42
Where are those rights today? As we know too well, they are effectively
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unavailable to most American workers. Over 9° percent of the employees in
the private sector are not working under collective bargaining conditions,43
and formidable obstacles stand in the way of their obtaining union repre-
sentation.44 According to recent polling reports, 5° percent of nonunion
workers in America would vote for a union if they were given the opportu-
nity,45 but under present conditions very few employees will have that op-
portunity. The international civil rights organization, Human Rights Watch,
recently conducted an investigation of the status of workers' freedom of as-
sociation in the United States and concluded, based on intensively docu-
mented evidence, that
millions of workers are excluded from coverage by laws to protect rights
of organizing, bargaining and striking. For workers who are covered by
such laws, recourse for labor rights violations is often delayed to a point
where it ceases to provide redress. When they are applied, remedies are
weak and often ineffective. In a system replete with all the appearance of
legality and due process, workers' exercise of rights to organize, to bargain,
and to strike in the United States have been frustrated by many employers
who realize they have little to fear from labor law enforcement through a
ponderous, delay-ridden legal system with meager remedial powers.46
Those conclusions have long been recognized, but legislative correction
has been unobtainable because of the sixty-member requirement to break a
filibuster in the U.S. Senate.47 But is legislative action the only means to re-
store the original democratic potential of the Wagner Act? It is my contention
that it is not. That Act-despite several amendments and judicially imposed
restrictions-still contains the basic elements that are sufficient to achieve
meaningful realization of democracy in the workplace.
For that reason, it is my purpose and concern in this book (I) to set forth
and explain the original and accurate reading of the NLRA concerning the
critical issue of less-than-majority collective bargaining in workplaces where
there is no exclusive/majority bargaining agent; (2) to describe how that
process can be utilized and developed through traditional unions, and to a
limited extent through alternative forms of employee representation; and (3)
to provide a reasoned forecast of the resulting impact of these changes on
the labor relations landscape.
Before the advent of statutory-based collective bargaining, which began
on the railroads with enactment of the Railway Labor Act (RLA}48 in 1926
and for other employee relations in 1933 with passage of Section 7{a) of the
Depression-era National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA},49 it had been tra-
ditional for unions to achieve bargaining rights based entirely on the extent
of their membership-often expressed by a strike for recognition. Elections
were not part of the organizational process. Elections for determining union
recognition developed relatively late in the history of American industrial re-
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lations. And when they finally appeared, they were used primarily to deter-
mine which union would be recognized when multiple unions were claiming
representation; that was their justification in the railroad industry where
such elections were first held.5O It was not until much later-but rarely prior
to passage of the Wagner Act-that another reason for elections developed:
to provide an employer with a reliable means to verify whether a union that
sought, or claimed, to represent all the employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit did in fact represent a majority.
Prior to the time when union recognition was conventionally based on
majority selection within a bargaining unit, it was commonly accepted-al-
though usually resisted by employers-that an employer had a duty to bar-
gain with any union that sought to represent its employee-members, whether
a minority or a majority union. And this was indeed the prevailing practice
under the Blue Eagle" Codes of Fair Competition" promulgated under NIRA
Section 7(a), which guaranteed the right of employees "to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing" -language that had
been derived from the Norris-LaGuardia Act of I932.51 Such legislative pro-
tection of the right of nonrailroad employees to organize into labor unions
and engage in collective bargaining had been preceded by judicial recogni-
tion in I930 of those general rights in the unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court in Texas & New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks, 52 in which Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote:
The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to safe-
guard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been recog-
nized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing
the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers relat-
ing to rates of pay and conditions of work.53
The Norris-Laguardia Act and Section 7(a) gave legislative expression to
those rights. And the same statutory text that defined those rights in the Blue
Eagle codes of the NIRA, which was enacted as a temporary measure, was
soon incorporated into permanent law in Section 7 of the I93 5 Wagner Act.
That statute, which was passed by overwhelming majority vote,54 explic-
itly-then and now-guarantees that employees have the right "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing" and provides
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of" that right. 55 From the beginning, Sen-
ator Wagner emphasized that his bill "creates no new substantive rights"56
and "does not present a single novel principle for the consideration of Con-
gress. "57 Leon Keyserling, his legislative assistant who drafted the bill, later
commented that the "background of the Wagner Act of I93 5 is contained in
the history of the National Industrial Recovery Act." Blue Eagle labor law
thus continued to prevail as the law of the land.
10 I The Blue Eagle at Work
Although minority-union bargaining received brief textual attention in
the drafting of Wagner's unsuccessful 1934 bill, such bargaining was never
perceived to be an issue in his 1935 bill. In the congressional debate on the
latter-the bill that eventually became law-the matter of preliminary mi-
nority-union bargaining was but a blip on the legislative screen. It was not
a contested issue, for such bargaining was widely recognized and accepted
at the time and was taken for granted even by employers; it was thus not
deemed controversial. The primary focus of the public debate that preceded
passage of the 1935 Act, both in and out of Congress-as legislative history
distinctly records-concerned other, more controversial questions: mainly
issues of company unions, the closed shop, majority-rule exclusivity, and
whether the Act was constitutional. The majority-rule exclusivity concept
represented the chosen legislative response to the prevailing problem of dual
unionism, where one of the contending unions was almost always a com-
pany union. Although the matter of members-only bargaining prior to the
establishment of majority representation received no direct attention in the
congressional debates, Wagner and Keyserling had carefully and knowingly
made certain in the drafting process and in the final text that such bargain-
ing would be protected. At the time, minority-union bargaining was fairly
common and was not viewed as a problem requiring special attention, pro-
vided no competing union was seeking or claiming recognition. While it is
true that employers were generally opposed to outside unions and they ve-
hemently objected to closed-shop unionism, where a minority union was
strong enough to obtain bargaining recognition for its own members and
was not insisting on exclusive representation, nonmajority status was a non-
issue. The legislative history of the enactment of the 1935 Wagner Act shows
positively that its authors fully and intentionally protected, in the broad text
of the statute, all minority-union bargaining that would occur prior to ma-
ture majority-based exclusivity bargaining.
As the reader will learn, numerous aspects of this history support that con-
clusion. However, one particular feature not previously noted in the litera-
ture provides a historical "smoking gun" that unequivocally validates this
deduction.58 Legislative history therefore confirms the plain reading of the
textual provisions that recognize the statutory protection afforded members-
only bargaining prior to the employees' selection of a majority union. Such
a reading-rather than the latter-day conventional wisdom-is the true state
of the law. The analyses presented here also establish that this statutory right
is part of a fundamental right of association that is consistent with and ulti-
mately protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and by
international law to which the United States is a confirming party. 59
It is sad, nevertheless, that after two-thirds of a century, this basic law re-
lating to minority-union bargaining has yet to be judicially articulated in the
manner originally intended by Congress. But long delay sometimes happens
to the best of statutes. To mention but one, it took more than a century for
--
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Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 186660 to begin to be applied in the
manner intended by Congress. As the Supreme Court reminded us in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,61 the fact that this civil rights "statute lay partially
dormant for many years does not diminish its force today."62 Belated appli-
cation of that statute to private acts of discrimination regarding disposition
of property-like the anticipated belated application of Sections 8(a)(I) and
8(a)( 5) of the NLRA to minority-union members-only bargaining-occurred
under uniquely similar circumstances: long-held custom and practice to the
contrary, conventional wisdom that assumed the statute did not really mean
what its words clearly said, and adverse judicial dicta. Better late than never.
It is my hope that this book will help restore an important missing link
in the American labor-relations system. That link-by now obvious-is the
reinvocation of the methodology of minority-union collective bargaining by
labor unions for their members only, for this is the natural preliminary stage
in the organizational development of mature, majority-based exclusivity
bargaining. When traditional unions reclaim the process of organizing by
representing and bargaining on behalf of their members from the very be-
ginning-or at least attempting to do so-they will be returning to their
roots. They will be organizing by recruiting dues-paying members-not
card-signers or potential voters, which is the common practice today. And
even if employers refuse to deal with these minority unions-which is not
unlikely for most employers, at least until the NLRB requires it or the judi-
ciary confirms it-membership-based organizing will make infinitely more
sense than the current alternative.
An actively organizing members-only union, even without the advantage
of formal collective bargaining, can make its mark in the workplace simply
by acting like a union. It can assist employees in many different ways, espe-
cially regarding concerted action for "mutual aid or protection" (another as-
pect of Section 7 rights). For example, it can offer a union steward to assist
any employee (whether or not a union member) who is called in for a disci-
plinary interview-a right that is otherwise not available to nonunion em-
ployees.63 And it can provide employees with a variety of social and economic
services that are not dependent upon a collective bargaining relationship.64
Such a fledgling union can thus become a clearinghouse for information and
action and an organizational link to an assortment of community activi-
ties,65 all of which are consistent with the role of a new union seeking to
prove its worth and expand its membership.66
More important, however, the new union will begin to represent its
members by engaging in its primary function, which is to negotiate on their
behalf about a variety of statutory bargaining subjects affecting their em-
ployment,67 albeit such bargaining will probably be conducted initially on
an ad hoc basis. The resulting premajority agreements, which will be legally
enforceable, will apply to union members only, although employers will
probably extend the same economic benefits to nonunion employees. But
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noneconomic benefits, such as grievance and arbitration procedures, will ap-
ply only to union members.68 When the minority union finally develops into
a majority union-which will likely occur in most instances-it will then be-
come the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the unit, whereupon
it will be legally entitled to function like any traditional majority union, with
collective bargaining applicable to all employees in the unit. The labor-rela-
tions system resulting from this rediscovered concept should be infinitely
more user friendly than the prevailing system. Employee morale ought to im-
prove significantly, and high-performance workplaces will probably become
more prevalent. It is also likely that the advent of members-only bargaining
will encourage the creation of a variety of alternative forms of employee rep- .
resentation. Indeed, the process may spawn many nontraditional employee
groupings.69
My goal in this book is therefore to call attention to a means that already
exists in present law to rationalize the respective but interdependent roles of
workers and employers. As Professors Paul Osterman and Thomas A.
Kochan and their colleagues aptly remind us, "work is a social as well as an
economic process [that] involves important moral values and power rela-
tionships that are not always reflected in the unregulated workings of mar-
ket forces."7o The government is therefore expected to provide a legal
environment that reflects the moral values of our society, "leaving the great-
est possible amount of control in the hands of those closest to the prob-
lems."71 That is the role of democracy in the workplace, and collective
bargaining is its repository.
Simplifying the process of labor organizing-a process that can again be
made available to all employees covered by the Act-will open the way to
wider and more meaningful employee participation in the collective bar-
gaining process. Under the broad umbrella of the NLRA, the nature of that
process can be tailor-made to fit the particular needs of almost any work-
place environment. Because the substantive provisions of that Act are brief
and simple,72 collective bargaining can take almost any form the parties vol-
untarily decide to give it. Properly understood and enforced, the NLRA can
thus offer the basis for a vibrant and flexible system of employee relations in
which the voices of organized workers can provide a healthy dose of coun-
tervailing economic and political power,73 which is now sorely deficient in
the American economy. I shall leave to the economists the task of defining
with some degree of precision how such a redistribution of power might ad-
dress the widening gap between the lowest and highest income earners in the
nation. It seems obvious, however, that the renewed presence of a strong la-
bor movement would once again represent a positive force for higher earnings
at the bottom- and middle-income levels of the economy and a restraining
factor on some of the out-oI-control earnings prevailing at the upper levels.
If so, this could be a viable means to help replenish the ranks of the vanish-
ing middle class. Such a prospective change is long overdue.
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I conclude this introduction by offering the reader some assistance in pick-
ing and choosing among the legal, historical, and industrial-relations por-
tions of this book, for I recognize that certain readers may wish to concentrate
only on specific parts. For example, most attorneys may be interested mainly
in the foundational legal materials, most union and human resources read-
ers may be especially concerned with the "how-to" and policy-oriented sec-
tions, and some labor history buffs may prefer to focus on the historical
materials. I wish to emphasize, however, that all the materials are integrated
and interrelated-and, I hope, they will prove to be clear and understand-
able to the interested reader.
Here then is a brief outline of the book's organizational format. Chapter
1 begins the account of the pertinent historical factors that preceded passage
of the Act. Chapters 2 and 3 continue that story, recounting the relevant parts
of legislative history that contribute to the thesis, and Chapter 4 covers poste-
nactment industrial-relations history. Chapter 5 provides legal analyses of
the statutory text; and Chapters 6, 7, and 8 examine the thesis from the per-
spectives of constitutional law, administrative law, and the dimensions of in-
ternational and human-rights law, respectively. Chapter 9 reviews the current
state of decisional law, and Chapter 10 provides a road map for the legal im-
plementation of the thesis. Chapter II provides "how-to" guidelines and
forecasts for membership-based union organizing. And Chapter 12 closes
with an overview of the likely outcome of the prospective changes and their
policy implications.
The reader should now be ready for this journey of legal rediscovery, a
journey that will reveal that the labor law of the Blue Eagle codes under Sec-
tion 7(a) of the 1933 NIRA is alive and well in the NLRA of today. The Blue
Eagle is at work and ready to fly again.
PART I
The Past as Prologue
- ---
I Membership-Based Collective
Bargaining, the Noms-LaGuardia Act,
and Section 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act
The Origin of the Statutory Specie
Although the underlying concern of this book is the elucidation of statutory
law, our interpretative journey begins with an examination of the historical
origins of the statutory text here in issue. Because this language has a long-
established historical meaning, our narrative begins with a recitation of that
text-a critical fourteen-word phrase. now contained in Section 7 of the
NLRA, the core provision that governs the right of minority unions to en-
gage in collective bargaining on behalf of their employee-members. The
phrase simply declares that
Employees shall have the right to . . . bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing. . . .1
Although that same language is contained in Section 2 (preamble) of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 from which the identical text in Section 7(a) of the
Depression-era NIRA3-the "Blue Eagle" law-was consciously derived,4
the administrative-although not the legislative-antecedent of this language
dates to yet an earlier instrument, to President Woodrow Wilson's procla-
mation that created the War Labor Board during World War 1.5 To appreci-
ate the evolutionary origin of this statutory specie, the reader's attention is
directed to the documentary excerpts that follow chronologically. These
quotations-identified by boldface and italic emphases (for substantive and
prohibitory language, respectively)-trace the passage of the critical statu-
tory language in a direct line of succession from the World War I proclama-
tion to comparable wording in Sections 7 and 8(1)6 of the NLRA. This
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unbroken line of text continues to this very day to establish the right of em-
ployees to engage in collective bargaining, including their right to do so
through minority unions in workplaces where no majority representative has
yet been designated.
From the 1918 National War Labor Board proclamation:
The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain collectively
through chosen representatives is recognized and affinned. This right shall
not be denied, abridged, or interfered with by employers in any manner
whatsoever. 7
From Section 2 of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corpo-
rate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline
to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that
he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .8
From Section 7(a) of the 1933 NIRA:
. . . employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.9
From Section 7 of the 1935 NLRA (Wagner Act):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities, for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .10
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And from Section (8)(1) of that Act:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an emplayer. . . to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce emplayees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 7 . . . ,11
It is self-evident from these passages that the basic fourteen-word bold-
face phrase in Section 7 of the Wagner Act, that "employees shall have the
right to ... bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing," which is the key language here in issue, is identical to the correspond-
ing phrase in Section 7(a) of the NIRA. It is to be further noted that the
related prohibitory language (italicized) in Section 8(1) of the Wagner Act,
except for immaterial changes in syntax, is likewise identical to the corre-
sponding prohibitory language in NIRA Section 7(a), which also matches
similar italicized prohibitory language in Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and in the War Labor Board proclamation.
This juxtaposition of text in its various legislative incarnations demon-
strates that the substantive law here in issue-albeit not its enforcement pro-
cedure-has been continuously in effect in one or more manifestations since
1932: first as congressional policy under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (which
is still in effect); thereafter from June 16, 1933,12 until May 27, 1935,13 as
a statutory requirement for all Blue Eagle codes of fair competition under
the National Recovery Administration (NRA); and thereafter since July 5,
1935 (when it became the law in its present form upon the signing of the
NLRA by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt), as current law.
Thus when the Wagner Act was first enacted, the critical language in Sec-
tions 7 and 8(1)-particularly the basic fourteen-word provision-had al-
ready acquired a recognized meaning. Despite some controversy regarding
other aspects of Section 7(a) of the NIRA, which will be noted in due course,
the language here in issue had never been deemed to require designation of
a majority representative as a precondition to collective bargaining, and this
is the only language in that statute that mandated such bargaining. By bor-
rowing in 1935 this exact language from preexisting legislation, Congress
was identifying and incorporating prevailing legislative meaning.
Although this book focuses primarily on the bargaining requirements ap-
plicable to employers vis-a.-vis minority unions composed of member em-
ployees, part of this examination necessarily sweeps more broadly to include
the full scope of congressional intent that motivated passage of the NLRA.
Because Congress did not seek to introduce major changes in preexisting sub-
stantive law-it sought only to reenact with clarity that same law and make
it realistically enforceable-the Wagner Act represented no significant di-
vergence from the way in which the core substantive provisions of the prior
law had been viewed and interpreted by the earlier boards that functioned
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under the NIRA. Such recognition that the Wagner Act's major innovations
concerned only procedures and remedies puts in perspective what Congress
intended to achieve in 1935 when it again provided for statutory facilitation
of collective bargaining.
From Membership-Based Collective Bargaining to the Enactment
of a New Deal for American Labor
Historically, including the years immediately preceding passage of the Wag-
ner Act, collective bargaining as an institution was intertwined with the con-
cept of union membership,14 As one academic observer wrote in 1927,
"[u)nless the employers recognize the union officials as spokesmen for mem-
bers of the union, there is, of course, no collective bargaining."15 In 1933,
another wrote that
Recognition is the admission on the part of an employer that his employ-
ees have a right to and may negotiate an agreement as a body rather than
as individuals and that he recognizes the union as the authorized agent of
those of his employees who are its members. . . .16
Unions thus normally bargained only on behalf of their members. I? Union
recognition by an employer usually occurred when the union's membership
was strong enough to demand and receive recognition-which more often
than not resulted from a strike or threat of a strike. Union membership was
the sine qua non of collective bargaining.
Majority selection by employees was not a requisite for union representa-
tion and collective bargaining. As Milton Derber, in his carefully researched
volume on industrial democracy, reported concerning trade unionism in the
nineteenth century, 18
The majority-rule principle. . . was not an established principle in deter-
mining union representation in the workplace. . . . Normally the union es-
tablished its status by persuading the employer of its desirability or by a
showing of strength through a strike. Majority rule played little or no role
on the management side.19
That description continued to be accurate well into the twentieth century.
For example, in its report on collective bargaining in the glass industry prior
to 1935, the Twentieth Century Fund concluded that "[s)igning an agree-
ment or obtaining recognition before a substantial union membership had
been gained were not uncommon in the industry."2o
Even the unions' penchant for closed-shop agreements fitted the nexus be-
tween membership and collective bargaining. When a union's membership
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was large enough to represent an effective voice for most if not all of the in-
volved employees, union leaders would usually perceive a need to ensure job
security for their members and guaranteed protection for the bargaining
process, which only closed-shop agreements could provide efficiently. More-
over, such agreements brought union coverage over otherwise free-riders and
also financial contributions from them. On the other hand, when a union
was not strong enough to obtain a closed shop or even full recognition, it of-
ten settled for a members-only collective agreement,21 for this was consid-
ered a logical step in the organizational process that would eventually lead
to total employee recognition. In these scenarios, it was the membership fac-
tor that provided the union with agency authority to engage in collective bar-
gammg.
During the pre-Wagner Act years of American labor history, strikes and
boycotts, or threats of such activity, were usually a union's only means of
securing recognition, for employers vigorously opposed dealing with any
outside unions. The list of tactics typically used by employers to avoid union-
ization is lengthy: companies inundated their employees with anti-union pro-
paganda and threats, frequently enforced yellow-dog contracts,22 employed
labor spies, organized company unions, discharged union adherents, ex-
changed blacklists of union militants, obtained labor injunctions to suppress
union activity, and on a number of occasions resorted to the use of goon
squads and armed force.23 Here is a typical observation from recorded
American labor history-this from Foster Rhea Dulles:
Nor was propaganda the only weapon employed in fighting unionism
and promoting the open shop. Many employers continued to force yellow-
dog contracts upon employees, to plant labor spies in their plants, to ex-
change black lists of undesirable union members, and openly follow the
most discriminatory practices in hiring workers. It was the old story of in-
timidation and coercion, and when trouble developed in spite of all such
precautions, strong-arm guards were often employed to beat up the trou-
ble-makers while incipient strikes were crushed by bringing in strikebreak-
ers under protection of local authorities.24
Elections for recognition were not part of that picture. In most industries,
elections and the concept of majority-union exclusivity did not evolve until
relatively late,2s although they appeared earlier in the railroad industry. Ac-
ceptance of the majoritarian concept occurred first on the railroads primar-
ily because "railroads were the first major industry where both labor and
management advocated the tenets of collective bargaining and sought to de-
velop procedures to make it work. "26 The original Railway Labor Act (RLA)
of 192627 did not provide for elections, although nonstatutory elections
were occasionally utilized on some of the railroads.28 As a result of the RLA
amendments of 1934,29 however, the National Mediation Board (NMB) was
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authorized to hold secret-ballot elections, within its discretion, to determine
"who are the representatives" of a "craft or class"3O of employees. Those
amendments also conferred exclusivity on majority unions by mandating
that "[t]he majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to
determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the pur-
poses of this Act."3! As our historical review will demonstrate, representa-
tion elections outside the railroad industry were not resorted to until late in
1933, following enactment of Section 7(a) of the NIRA.32
In 1932, the year Norris-LaGuardia was passed, a union's majority was
not relevant to an employee's right to designate "representatives of his own
choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment. . . ."33
That key phrase in the Norris-LaGuardia preamble and its accompanying
language was, in the words of Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Green, "in-
tended as an explicit avowal of the considerations moving Congressional ac-
tion and, therefore, controlling any loyal application of national policy by
the COurtS,"34for it was their view that "it is the primary function of the leg-
islature to define public policy. "35 Collective bargaining was thus declared
to be the national policy applicable to every employee in America. When the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in early March, 1932-well in advance
of the national elections-it "was overwhelmingly supported in both the
House and Senate and received widespread popular approval."36 Indeed,
that Act set the tone for the New Deal legislation of the following year. The
collective bargaining and right-of-association policy described in its pream-
ble became the model for the labor provisions of the new legislation. Its state-
ment of policy, which stressed the importance of the individual employee's
right to choose his own representative, implicitly affirmed that collective bar-
gaining was not dependent on majority designation.37 As a Brookings Insti-
tution report observed just prior to passage of the Wagner Act,
The language of this declaration [in the Norris-LaGuardiaActJ was truly
extraordinary. It expressed a thoroughgoing change of previous legislative
policy with regard to labor organization. The act was premised on the idea
that there could ordinarily be no equality of liberty of contract between em-
ployer and employee except on the basis of organized and collective bar-
gaining. That the Act contemplated collective bargaining in according with
trade union practices is clear from the fact that it was sponsored by the A.
F. of L. and that specific provisions were directed against many of the prac-
tices whereby the courts in the past had made it difficult for trade unions
to organize and to carry on their activities.38
Following the 1932 elections, the new president, Franklin Roosevelt,
quickly proceeded to implement his New Deal program to fight the Depres-
sion and revitalize the American economy. The Administration's immediate
objective was to stimulate business and thereby reduce unemployment. Cen-
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tral among its early legislative programs to achieve those goals was the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery bill,39 the principal feature of which was suspen-
sion of the antitrust laws to permit companies to join with others in their
industry through "codes of fair competition" that would cooperatively reg-
ulate prices, production, and labor standards. Pragmatically realizing that
full labor support would be essential to the success of that program, the new
Administration recognized early in the planning stages that it would need to
balance those novel economic freedoms for business with a grant of rights
for employees and unions that would promote labor organizing and collec-
tive bargaining.4O To develop and guide this labor portion of the legislative
package-which became Section 7(a) of the NIRA-the President turned
mainly to Senator Robert F. Wagner of his own state of New York. Wagner,
"recognized as the member of Congress most active in the labor field,"41
seized the opportunity to fashion legislation that would foster his long-cher-
ished objective of linking collective bargaining with the democratic process.
It was Wagner's view that a partnership between industry and labor was
an "indispensable complement to political democracy"42 and that such dem-
ocratic self-government in industry would require the active participation of
workers. He therefore insisted that "the right to bargain collectively is at the
bottom of social justice for the worker, as well as the sensible conduct of
business affairs[, for] the denial of observance of this right means the differ-
ence between despotism and democracy. "43 Wagner's vision of industrial
democracy was a manifestation of a venerable and highly respected concept
in American political and economic thought. Milton Derber, who traced that
idea in his insightful study, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy,
1865-1965,44 reported an early reference attributed to Albert Gallatin, Sec-
retary of the Treasury under both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, re-
garding a profit-sharing plan in his Pennsylvania glass works, which was that
"[t]he democratic principle on which this nation was founded should not be
restricted to the political process but should be applied to the industrial op-
eration as well.,,45 And the 1902 Final Report of the United States Indus-
trial Commission46 recommended that democracy be instituted in industry
as follows:
By the organization of labor, and by no other means, it is possible to intro-
duce an element of democracy into the government of industry. By this means
only the workers can effectively take part in determining the conditions un-
der which they work. This becomes true in the fullest and best sense only
when employers frankly meet the representatives of the workmen, and deal
with them as parties equally interested in the conduct of affairs. It is only un-
der such conditions that a real partnership of labor and capital exists.47
Senator Wagner was indeed pursuing a long-recognized social objective, a
goal that Louis D. Brandeis had described in his 1915 testimony before an-
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other industrial relations commission. Viewing the American commitment
to social justice as an incident of democracy, Brandeis stressed that
the end for which we must strive is the attainment of rule by the people,
and that involves industrial democracy as well as political democracy. That
means that the problem of trade should be no longer the problem of the
employer alone. The problems of his business, and it is not the employer's
business alone, are the problems of all in it.48
Although several draftsmen were ultimately involved in the crafting of
Section 7(a), the principal writer was Donald R. Richberg, who had been one
of the authors of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.49 One contemporaneous report
on the resulting provision observed that it was obviously patterned after Sec-
tion 2 of the latter statute, "even to employing much of its phraseology."5o
Richberg's subsequent interpretation of key phrases of Section 7(a), to be
noted later, contributes to our understanding of what that language was rec-
ognized to mean when the NIRA was in effect.
Section 7(a), in its final version as passed, read as follows:
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, pre-
scribed, or issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (I)
That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employ-
ment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organiza-
tion of his own choosing; and (3) that employees shall comply with the
maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of
employment, approved or prescribed by the President. 51
The President selected Wagner to introduce the NIRA bill in the Senate. 52 It
quickly sailed through Congress, and Roosevelt signed it on June 16, 1933.53
The Blue Eagle, displayed by companies participating in the codes of fair
competition, now became the symbolic icon of the federal government's new
role in labor relations.
Wagner was pleased with the final product. A year later he recalled that
in passing Section 7(a), "Congress [had] projected into economic affairs the
essence of true democracy, by outlining a system of checks and balances be-
tween industry and labor, crowned by governmental supervision and ad-
vice. "54
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The Short Life of "Self-Policing" and Mediation
Inasmuch as Section 7(a) contained no explicit means of enforcement, its ef-
fectiveness depended on factors that were uncertain or unknown when the
statute was passed. On its face, the collective bargaining obligation in Sec-
tion 7(a) does not appear to have required any precondition other than the
presence of an identifiable group of employees who are members of a labor
organization that seeks to represent them in bargaining collectively with
their employer. The basic fourteen-word provision required no more and no
less. This process could embrace either minority- or majority-union bar-
gaining-even proportional bargaining with two or more labor organiza-
tions. As labor historian James Gross perceptively recognized, "its wording
was susceptible to interpretations that would sanction. . . proportional
rather than exclusive representation. "55 The provision contained no refer-
ence to majority representation.
Shortly after passage of the NlRA, General Hugh S. Johnson, who had
been appointed head of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the
agency charged with administering the Act, announced with reference to
Section 7(a) that he looked "to this new industrial self-government to be self-
policing," although he acknowledged that if there were violations the gov-
ernment "could step in. "56 That concept of "self-policing" remained the
policy of the Administration for only a short time, however. Encouraged by
the enactment of Section 7(a), the trade union movement undertook a mas-
sive organizational campaign that exceeded any such activity since World
War 1,57 and in July, immediately after passage of the Act, a wave of strikes
swept over the country. In that month, 1,375,000 worker-days were lost due
to strikes, and in August the number rose to 2,378,000, which was three
times the average for the first half of 1933.58 The magnitude of these strikes
prompted the Administration to immediately create some form of govern-
mental machinery to address the settlement of labor-management disputes;59
whereupon, on August 5, 1933, President Roosevelt announced the estab-
lishment of a National Labor Board (NLB)60 to assist in the implementation
of Section 7(a). This represented the first institutional attempt to shape 7(a)
"in the NRA mold of voluntary self-government."61 However, Roosevelt is-
sued no executive order defining the Board's authority at that time. His an-
nouncement simply stated that the Board would "consider, adjust, and settle
differences and controversies"62 among disputing parties. It was not until
December 16, 1933, that the President issued his first executive order ac-
knowledging the Board's existence and defining its authority, but that order
still left the matter of its jurisdiction in a state of uncertainty.63 In fact,
throughout its tenure, the "Board was never quite sure of its own author-
ity. "64
In accordance with the Administration's voluntary self-policing approach,
